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CASE COMMENTS
cause of an injury. But the distinction is that of result or legal
liability. The thought suggested by a review of the cases and
particularly the principal case is that perhaps the problem of
distinction is one of undue emphasis, resulting from explaining
acts which although definitely of a causative nature, when viewed
together with all the facts, are not the proximate cause of an
injury. This thought is strengthened by the fact that a problem,
and apparently confusion, also exists in other jurisdictions as to
the importance of a condition or occasion of an injury. Stewart v.
Minneapolis St. Ry., supra, shows how the Minnesota court is
approaching the problem and at least one other court is even
more definite.
In Kinderavich v. Palmer, 127 Conn. 85, 15 A.2d 83 (1940),
the court rather tersely remarked that a statement that an act or
omission is a "condition" and not a cause of an injury means no
more than that it is not a "proximate cause" of that injury.
C. S. McG.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-WRIT OF ERROR-SPECIAL BILL OF
EXCEPTIONs-SPECIFICATION OF ERROR.-During a homicide trial D
was asked and required to answer a question on cross examination
over the objection of D's counsel. A motion for mistrial was over-
ruled by the trial court and an exception taken. A writ of error
to the circuit court was refused on the basis that the alleged error
had not been specifically made a ground in support of D's motion
for a new trial or incorporated in a special bill of exceptions. Held,
that the court may and should consider alleged errors arising on
the rulings of a trial court in the admission or rejection of evidence
objected to, where alleged errors in the admission or rejection of
evidence, to which objection has been made in the trial court, are
specifically set forth as ground of a motion to set aside a verdict
and grant a new trial; or incorporated in a special bill of exceptions;
or are incorporated in the assignments of errors contained in the
petition for writ of error; or set forth in the brief of counsel; or
otherwise specifically brought to the attention of the trial court.
State v. Bragg, 87 S.E.2d 689 (W. Va. 1955) (3-2 decision).
The court has been confronted with two conflicting lines' of
decision on the question of consideration of error arising on rulings
of the trial court. One line of reasoning is that found in Gregory's
Adm'r v. Ohio River R.R., 37 W. Va. 606, 16 S.E. 819 (1893),
that, "objections and exceptions to the admission or rejection of
1
U.: Pleading and Practice--Writ of Error--Special Bill of Exceptions-
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1955
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
evidence, although fully noted in the transcript of the evidence
embodied in a bill of exceptions, would not be considered by the
appellate court unless (1) the objection and exception were made
the subject of a special bill of exceptions, or (2) the ruling of the
court on the objection should be specifically assigned as ground of
error on the motion for a new trial." Carlin, The Transcript of
the Evidence as a Substitute for Special Bills of Exception, 32 W.
VA. L.Q. 321, 324 (1926).
In contrast with that case and in line with the instant decision
is the other position found in the leading case of Kay v. Glade
Creek R.R., 47 W. Va. 467, 472, 35 S.E. 973, 975 (1900), that, "if
the assignment of error or brief of counsel dearly and distinctly
specifies the question refused or allowed,-the particular point
complained of, with a specification of its place in the report of the
proceedings,-this court ought to consider it; otherwise not."
The court had previously attempted clarification of this pro-
cedural question. Hinton Milling Co. v. New River Milling Co.,
78 W. Va. 314, 88 S.E. 1079 (1916), adopted the principles of Kay
v. Glade Creek R.R., supra, while the court in Ritz v. Kingdon,
79 S.E.2d 123 (W. Va. 1953), adopted the reasoning of Gregory's
Adm'r v. Ohio River R.R., supra. The court in both cases went to
some length to state that clarification of procedure was to result
from the respective decisions.
Ritz v. Kingdon, supra, was decided subsequent to the enact-
ment of W. VA. CODE C. 56, art. 6, § 37 (1931), which is concerned
with the proper procedure for bringing errors to the notice of the
appellate court. The last sentence of this section, according to the
revisers note, "is in accord with the views expressed in Hinton
Milling Co. v. New River Milling Co.," supra.
The judicial inconsistency of the two lines of decisions ap-
parently stems from the issue of whether special bills of exception
are necessary to point out to the appellate court the particular
objections and exceptions relied upon for reversal. The lack of such
necessity is pointed out by the opinion in Kay v. Glade Creek R.R.,
supra. This lack of necessity coupled with the reality that "the appel-
late court is usually under the necessity of reading the whole evidence
for other purposes, and thus becomes familiar with the context,"
Carlin, The Transcript of the Evidence as a Substitute for Special
Bills of Exceptions, supra, when read in the light of W. VA. CODE
c. 56, art. 6, § 37 (Michie 1955), supports the line of decisions stem-
ming from Kay v. Glade Creek R.R., supra, including the instant
case.
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It is submitted, however, that interpretation of the words "or
otherwise specifically brought to the attention of the court," as
here used, may result again in confusion as to proper appellate
procedure.
H. G. U.
TAXATIoN-ORDINARY AND NECESSARY EXPENSE-CAPITAL Loss
DISTINGUISHED.-To insure performance of a contract with A, B
was required to deposit United States government bonds in escrow.
Not owning bonds, B borrowed money to purchase them. After
performance, and release of the bonds, B sold them at a loss,
deducting the loss from income as a business expense. The Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue claimed such loss must be'shown
as a capital loss. Held, that the loss was a business expense, as a
sale of assets held for sale in the ordinary course of business. Con-
missioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co., 221 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955).
The principal case is the latest in a series of decisions concern-
ing a loss incurred on resale of an asset purchased as an aid to the
purchaser's business, but not directly connected with the everyday
scope of the business.
The Internal Revenue Code provides in part as follows: "In
computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions . . .
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on the trade of business.... ." INT. REV.
CODE OF 1939, § 23 (a) (1) (A), 53 STAT. 12 (now INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 162). A capital loss results from the sale at a loss of a
capital asset, defined as ".. . property held by the taxpayer (whether
or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include
... property held by the taxpayer, primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of his trade or business. . . ." INT. REv.
CODE OF 1939, § 117 (a) (1), 53 STAT. 50 (now INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 1221). The distinction is important, in that a corporation
can deduct a capital loss only when it offsets a capital gain, being
allowed to carry this loss forward for a five year period. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1939, § 117 (d) (1), (e) (1), as amended, 56 STAT. 842
(1942) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1211, 1212. The taxpayer
in the instant case had no capital gains to balance against a capital
loss. The court seemed to have difficulty in placing the bonds into
the exception of property held primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of business, particularly in view of the fact
that the taxpayer had not previously engaged in dealings of this
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